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On 12 March 1999 three countries that had been parties to the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (WTO) and members of the Soviet-led military alliance based on this
Treaty as little as 10 years ago joined the Atlantic Alliance. The first phase of NATO
enlargement to the former Warsaw Treaty, and somewhat more broadly to the East, has
thus been completed. It is open to question when this is going to be followed by a second
wave. The experience of the first three new members from the East will thus be exclusive
and decisive for at least some years to come. It is decisive not only in the political life of
the three new members, but also of the Alliance. The performance of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, their readiness to play along with other members of the Alliance,
to contribute to extra-territorial operations, to modernise their training and equipment
may be regarded important when the Alliance is to decide if and when to continue the
enlargement process. Consequently, the three new members should live up to their
responsibility and recognise that they can do a major disservice to the enlargement process,
and more generally to the Alliance if they turn out to be troublesome allies.
This paper argues that the integration of the three new members will affect both
“sides”. It has been evident for some time that the threat perception, security policy,
and military strategy of the three new members have been undergoing a major re-
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arrangement, both during the phase of preparation for membership and since their
accession. It could be less evident that the Atlantic Alliance will not be left unaffected
by, presumably only, the first wave of eastern enlargement. I think this to be correct
despite the probably wide-spread assumption that the mutual influence between the
three “new” and the 16 “old” member-States will be asymmetric. The 16 “old” member-
State will most probably exert a greater influence on the three than the other way round.
The accession process has remained for most part political. Military-technical
considerations played no role in an early phase of the process and a limited one
afterwards. Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance has remained with the task of integrating
the three countries militarily largely following accession. This seems to be correct in
spite of the major contribution of Partnership for Peace and the participation in the
IFOR/SFOR operation to military adaptation during the Kosovo conflict. In spite of
this one can state that the three do not live up to NATO standards militarily, though,
of course the expectations presented by different members are not identical. The U.S.
is certainly more demanding than some smaller European member countries.
One could go further and state that the three new members represent a “new
generation” of military-technology in NATO not possessed by any other member-state
in the Alliance. This is the equipment of the Warsaw Treaty made in the Soviet Union
or under Soviet licence. This statement is certainly correct. It would be necessary, however
to pay attention to the fact that several members of the Alliance were not entirely
compatible with NATO standards for a long period of time after accession. (e.g. Germany
until 1967, Denmark until 1972.) Thus the question is not whether the new members
are compatible now. It is whether they make steady and sufficiently strong efforts to
achieve compatibility in key areas soon or they don’t. In order to make the three countries
eligible for membership the requirements were lowered to minimum compatibility in
certain key areas. It is for a fact that not even those have been fully met.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can be regarded as countries with similar
characteristic features, which is true insofar as all the three countries are: 1) located in East-
Central Europe; 2) new democracies; 3) former members of the WTO; and 4) it was their
strong will and efforts that was rewarded by membership in NATO. If one takes a close
look to this list it is easy to conclude that the common features are either of very general
nature or they are related to the past. There are some important common politico-military
aspects of the three countries. None of them is a great power or even a large country.
Without exception none of them has pursued a policy taker –rather than a policy maker– role
in their international affairs since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, their defence sectors
(and defence budgets) were in steady decline during the larger part of the last decade. This
trend was halted in 1997 or in 1998 and was promised to be reversed during the accession
talks. Each of the three has dated military equipment, and joined NATO with
overwhelmingly Warsaw Treaty (Soviet, or Soviet-licensed) armaments and equipment.
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There are major differences among the three as well. They have been largely
overshadowed by the commonalities and the fairly little knowledge of the specificities of
the countries of the region in the West. If one takes a closer look at the Western attitude
toward East-Central Europe the conclusion can be drawn that the knowledge of the former
has developed gradually throughout the 1990s. We have reached a phase when not only
experts and analysts can differentiate between e.g. Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest and Sofia,
but business circles and Western political establishments can do so as well.
In the beginning of the 1990s it was enough to state that Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and Poland were all members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Soviet troops were
stationed on their territory and the political control of the armed forces was carried out
by the Communist Party. In the late 1990s (now 2000) it is necessary to know why the
role and prestige of the armed forces in the societies of the three new members is different.
It is furthermore important to know, in light of the different standings of the militaries,
what level of professional expertise can be expected to develop in defence matters and to
what extent can sacrifices be expected to be made and legitimised in the society.
It is the starting point of the paper that the three new members have become different
in nearly every aspect of their security and defence and thus it is for the most part impossible
to draw major general conclusions for the future of their NATO contribution beyond a
certain point of generality. The relevant differences are as follows: First, the size of the
countries. Poland claims to be a middle power whereas the Czech Republic and Hungary
are significantly smaller. The latter two are of similar size and population. Second, their
geo-strategic location. Poland is the second member of the Atlantic Alliance, having a
(661 km-s) long land border with Russia and another long one with Russia “proxy” Belarus.
Hungary is neighbouring the CIS area (Ukraine) and more importantly three former
Yugoslav republics, including (as the only NATO member-country) Serbia. The Czech
Republic, for the first time in its history, has an enviable location, surrounded by allies
(Poland and Germany) and friends (Austria and Slovakia). It is a lower common
denominator that the three countries are the eastern-most members of the Atlantic Alliance,
“front-line states” which are of the view that the defence of their national territory matters. 
Third, the location has major repercussions for the threat perception of the three
countries. Whereas the Czech Republic is in a threat-free environment, the other two
perceive some threat. Traditionally, Hungary has underestimated the military threat,
whereas Poland, for historical reasons, has tended to overestimate it. Fourth, they have
different military legacies. In the Czech Republic and Hungary there is a deep-rooted
disbelief in the possibility of national self-defence. The Polish military heritage makes
it easier to legitimise major defence efforts than the Czech and the Hungarian ones.
Fifth, the Czech Republic is unique in the sense that the army of that country is the
only one from among the three that never ruled the country in its entire history1. Sixth, the
three countries had different arms industries and exports. Czechoslovakia used to produce
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and export armaments on a large scale (the more sophisticated part of its production base
was inherited by the Czech Republic). Poland had a comparatively smaller, though still
significant, industry. Hungary’s was insignificant and specialised in the Warsaw Treaty
/bridging equipment and radio transmitters. Lately it has largely been reduced to supplying
the country’s defence forces with uniforms and ammunition. Thus its military companies
were wound up or privatised when the military production terminated. Seventh, the three
countries differed in the way their transition took place in the defence sector. Due to the
nature of the Czechoslovak Communist regime between 1968 and 1989 and to the subsequent
“enlightenment” early efforts were made to create a new military leadership, and thus some
“human compatibility” with NATO. In the other two countries the change has been hesitant
due to the more gradual transition. In Poland a certain breakthrough was achieved in 1996,
whereas a major defence reform has recently started in Hungary, promised to be continued.
THREAT PERCEPTIONS, STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Ever since the three new NATO members left the Warsaw Treaty a decade ago their
declared threat perceptions –and the military strategies based on it– have followed a similar
pattern. The East-West confrontation was replaced by uncertainty as the main source of
threat and thus a highly ambiguous image of an enemy developed for countries of the
region. Moreover, the security perception of the countries of East-Central Europe, including
the three new members of NATO, deteriorated during the first years of the post-Cold War
era. These comparatively small countries, exposed to new and unknown dangers, hot wars
instead of a cold one, felt e.g. “more insecure in 1994 than they did in 1989”2. It was more
or less clear that countries of the region were of the view there was no individual (i.e. non-
collective) remedy for their diminished security. With NATO membership this remedy
has been provided and now each feel significantly more secure than here-to-fore.
On the one hand, the above-mentioned uncertainty carried the advantage of
making nearly any strategic rearrangement possible and provided for the foundation
of the necessary flexibility in military matters. On the other, it carried the danger that
in light of other priorities no particular attention would be paid to defence matters,
with no resources being allocated to maintain (or establish) modern armed forces.
The situation was aggravated by subjective factors. Namely, in light of the uncertainty
of the danger in carrying out experiments in the defence sector and also in regards the
disrespect towards the autonomy of the military profession, which was further exacerbated
by the arbitrary reference to the “civilian control of the armed forces”, very often meaning
direct interference of the political leadership in strictly military matters. Civilian defence
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ministers were understandably unable to cope with complex military matters and have
only exceptionally realised that there is only one way to break the vicious circle: to separate
the different functions and respect the autonomy of military authorities.
There is another side of the coin, however. Namely, the Warsaw Treaty was a
highly centralised organisation also in military terms. In coalition warfare, the decisions
were in the hands of the “lead nation” of the Warsaw Treaty. In spite of the training
received by many Czech, Polish and Hungarian generals in Soviet general staff academies,
the ultimate decisions on the strategic level remained in Moscow’s domain. It remained
for the commanders of the smaller Warsaw Treaty countries to integrate their troops
on the operational level with Soviet-led forces3. Consequently, one has serious doubts
whether anyone in any of the three current new NATO members had relevant strategic
knowledge when the Warsaw Treaty came to an end4.
Thus, throughout the 1990s one has experienced a certain helplessness in East-Central
Europe as far as the military component of security was concerned. The laymen’s positions
on both sides (defence-political and military) of the decision-making process resulted in
brinkmanship. Hasty military reform plans were not followed by implementation because
over-politicised decisions could not respect the military life-cycle. The autonomy of the
military was not respected by governments. Had it been respected the outcome would not
have been different as politics was not in the position to allocate the necessary resources
to back decisions. In the previous paragraphs I tried to prove that the fault-line in defence
policy was not only the reflection of an objective situation, but of subjective factors as well.
Surprisingly, these have had some positive repercussions; for it is easier to carry out strategic
integration in the absence of a national security strategy based on in-depth consideration
of national interests that would contradict upcoming commitments in the Alliance. The
ease with which the NATO integration of military thinking of the three countries takes
place is not only due to the fact that the three countries are policy takers internationally;
rather it is also due to the severe imbalance between the existence of relevant strategic
knowledge in the Alliance and some of its leading member States, most notably the United
States, on the one hand, and the lack thereof in the three new member-states, on the other.
Those from the new member States who have acquired relevant strategic knowledge after
the end of the East-West conflict went through training at Western military academies
and were thus in most cases trained in the spirit of Alliance strategy.
It has been emphasised many times that to develop civilian expertise in defence matters
is a long and painstaking process in countries where it was non-existent for decades. It is
seldom mentioned, however, that in countries where the theoretical basis for defence –and
the military practices that outgrow from it– had to go through fundamental change in a
relatively short time period, the relevant professional military expertise may stay at a low
level for a long time. It seems that the military professionals in East-Central Europe were
in similarly deep trouble as their civilian counterparts during the 1990s. Under the conditions
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mentioned above the strategic adaptation of those countries that became members of the
Atlantic Alliance in March 1999 could not have started with the chance of success without
a major external force that could provide the necessary inducement and orientation.
It is open to question whether the three new members of NATO will represent certain
unique strategic features in the Alliance framework. It is necessary to refer once again to
the different geo-strategic location of the three countries in this respect, where it has to be
emphasised that in light of the existence of the common strategy of the Alliance, national
strategic peculiarities may remain tacit. In politico-strategic terms one has reason to assume
that at least Poland and Hungary will attribute greater significance to the defence of national
territory than many other member-States. This might result in some disagreement between
some of the new members and the United States, which currently appears as champion of
giving priority to power projection and the reduction in the importance of defending
territory. This would be deplorable as the new members, at least as far as the two countries
mentioned above, inasmuch as they have a solid Atlantic emphasis in their security policy.
Suffice it is to refer to a Polish and a Hungarian document in this respect. The former states
that “All arrangements concerning European Security and Defence Policy … should reinforce
the transatlantic link and the US presence in Europe and thereby stability and security on
the continent”5. The Hungarian paper does not differ by much: “NATO’s collective defence
commitment constitutes the key guarantee for Hungary’s security. … The continued
commitment to a firm transatlantic relationship and the strategic co-operation between
NATO and the European Union are the prerequisites of … effective European crisis
prevention”6. In light of the recent NATO membership of the three East-Central European
States and their aspiration to gain EU membership in the years to come it is in the best
interest of these countries to consolidate the second pillar of the EU and establish European
defence in close cooperation with the U.S. and without conflict between the two.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
OF THE ALLIANCE - NOW AND IN THE FUTURE
While it is easy to understand how NATO could contribute to the security of the
three countries it is less evident whether the Alliance has become “better off” with
eastern enlargement. Politically, arguably it has. The (first) eastern enlargement sends
the message that the East-West division can be overcome and offers the prospect of
membership to other eligible countries, thus carrying an important message. It can also
be argued that enlargement further consolidates stability in the region.
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In military-strategic terms, the enlargement is a mixed blessing, which can be assessed
differently depending upon the starting point. On the one hand, it can be seen as extending
the area of responsibility of the Alliance to countries that may be exposed to some security
challenges, i.e. to areas where it eventually might be necessary to fulfil the promise of
collective defence. If one accepts this, enlargement can be regarded as a net loss. On the
other hand, however, one can conclude that since 12 March 1999 the security guarantee
has been extended to countries, which de facto belonged to NATO’s area of responsibility
earlier as well. If one shares the latter view, the assessment is to the opposite, enlargement
is certainly not a net loss. This simplified picture, however, does not give any idea about
the contribution the three new members can make to the Alliance.
If one accepts that the three new members’ NATO contribution in the future is
dependent upon a major modernisation of their armed forces it certainly affects their
NATO perception how this requirement is presented to them and to what extent they
are willing to meet it. The three new members are relatively poor countries, both as far
as their gross economic output and their per capita GDP are concerned. Can the three
finance the necessary modernisation and what do they have to do? These were the two
questions dominating the pre-accession discussions.
There is no need to enter into details concerning different estimates about the
costs of enlargement, seeing as that each of the four studies prepared in 1996 and 1997
seemed to have been manipulated or, to put it differently, each had started out from
certain assumptions that have since proved unfounded. The first two, those of the
RAND Corporation and of the Congressional Budget Office considered full
compatibility of the new members as an early objective. Furthermore, if both made
their calculations based on traditional military threats, one would be tempted to say
they inflated the perceived threat. And even though the calculated costs were fairly high
for the members of the Alliance, old and new, these studies might have been willing
to indicate that the costs were unaffordable. They did not, though.
When enlargement became a widely shared objective of the Alliance and the U.S.
administration two further studies came to light. The State Department concluded
that direct enlargement costs would be 700-900 million USD, or 9-12 billion USD
totally for the period between 1997-2009, the date by which new members were
“anticipated to have reached a mature capability”7. In the autumn of 1997 the Alliance
also published its own report that went further down with the estimates, stating that
the overall cost of enlargement for the 16 members would be approximately 1.3-1.5
billion USD. Perhaps the impression is that the numbers were incredibly low in order
not to cause any problems to any one of those sixteen States that still had to ratify the
accession protocols with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. One can only guess
how the several dozens of billions of USD estimated by some U.S. institutions were
reduced to less than 1.5 billion. There is neither a single nor a simple answer to the
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question, but it has to be noted that a good portion of the costs have since been
reallocated and will have to be borne by the new members themselves. As the costs on
the new members have not grown exponentially, this explanation could not cover the
difference of estimates fully; there was another major difference in the calculation
method. Namely, the NATO estimate was based on extensive evaluation visits in the
three countries, which extended beyond interviews with the military leadership. Visits
took place at major military installations, including airfields, where the capacity to host
NATO reinforcements in case of necessity was thoroughly analysed. As one NATO
official involved in the drafting of the document put it: one of the reasons why the
estimated cost of enlargement was so low was that NATO, in light of field experience,
did not go for “gold-plated solutions” but for minimum compatibility.
As the major portion of enlargement costs are to be covered by the new members
the Alliance has given priority to the steady, transparent and predictable increase of
the defence budgets of the three countries. These took commitments to increase their
defence budgets by a certain percentage point of their GDP in the coming years in
order to reach the NATO average. There is a lot to catch up with for two reasons:
defence allocations during the existence of the Warsaw Treaty were used to maintain
an antiquated military structure; and after the end of the East-West conflict the defence
budgets had been declining steadily until the late 1990s in each country.
According to the latest data available from among the 19 members of the Alliance,
the defence budgets of the Czech Republic and Hungary increased the most significantly.
In comparison with the previous year, the defence budgets of the Czech Republic
increased by 8.3, Hungary by 6.7 and Poland by 2.1 per cent in real terms in 1999. A
problem for the future is that according to plans the new member states will increase
their military allocations on the basis of an increasing GDP. This, as the example of
the Czech Republic has demonstrated in the past few years, is not a foregone conclusion8.
One should raise the question whether this is the most effective way to increase the
defence efforts of the new members. This approach, which focuses on the fiscal aspect
of the compatibility of the new members’ armed forces with NATO standards, has been
present since the beginning of the enlargement process and has proved at least partially
to be a fault-line. Except for selected areas where it is important to achieve minimum
compatibility, the need to increase the defence budget has not been specific enough and
has not contributed to the achievement of certain force goals, goal requirements which
appeared fairly late in the accession preparation process. The Atlantic Alliance and some
of its leading member states did not understand that the increase of military allocations
did not automatically guarantee that the money would be spent well and thus be reflected
in an improvement of military capabilities. An ineffective military structure, not to
mention an incompetent or corrupt military leadership, may easily waste the increasing
military allocations. On the other hand, the increased resources may also be used to ease
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accumulated social tensions in the military9. The lesson one can draw from the experience
of the first eastern enlargement of NATO is that it is necessary to agree upon concrete
force goals much earlier in the accession process in the future.
The Military Committee of the Alliance directed SHAPE (in co-operation with
SACLANT) to prepare a study on the military requirements of an enlarged NATO. The
Military Committee directed SHAPE to focus the study on enlargement requirements
eligible for common NATO funding in four areas: command, control and communication
(C3) capabilities, necessary integrated air defence and associated air command and control,
reinforcement infrastructure, training and exercises. Though it is impossible here to enter
into details on every aspect of these, it has to be noted that the so-called Bi-MNC
Requirements Study spelled out that the C3 requirements were crucial and had to be
met as soon as possible. The initial focus was on linking NATO headquarters and
“invitees’” headquarters as integration into the Integrated Air Defence System is mandatory.
Upon accession the invited nations’ Air Sovereignty Operations Centres (ASOCs) had
to be linked with NATO air command and control. After accession, additional command
and control upgrades were necessary to further integrate new members into the air defence
system of NATO and, ultimately, into the emerging Air Command and Control System
of the Alliance. The study concluded that the combined force levels of the 16 and the
invited members were adequate to cope with the assumed threat. Infrastructure required
for transport of land reinforcements in the invited countries was also found adequate,
whereas reinforcement air-bases were found to require improvements to meet NATO
standards. It was clear that due to the differences in interoperability in command and
staff procedures, considerable effort would be needed to train, exercise, and assess the
new members’ capabilities in these areas.
A lot has happened ever since the three countries have been invited to negotiate NATO
membership. As the results of adaptation have become an “in-house matter” after the
accession of the three countries fairly little is known about the level of compatibility
achieved. It may be illustrative, however, that during the Kosovo operation that started
12 days after accession, the Hungarian airspace was still patrolled by the aircraft of other
NATO countries, and not by the Hungarian air force because the Identity Friends-or-Foe
(IFF) system was not NATO compatible and the presence of Hungarian planes in the
country’s (own) airspace would have created problems for the operation. If this information
is correct, then at least in one area minimum compatibility was not achieved by accession10.
It is not known, however, whether the IFF incompatibility was the real reason. Possibly
not even the air-wing of MiG-29s –of which 27 pieces are still in the arsenal, the most
modern planes of Hungary– could have carried out the patrolling function11. 
Modernisation of the arsenal is another requirement in order to meet the technical
interoperability with NATO forces, which should be done by either upgrading existing
weapon systems or procuring new ones from abroad. There is a lot to do in this area.
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For some reasons particular attention has been paid to the procurement of multipurpose
aircraft. This has been the case despite there being many other areas where major
procurement could occur ranging from air transport to helicopters and others. All three
countries have slightly different opinions concerning their domestic industrial potential
and financial constraints. Poland, for example, has contemplated building its own aircraft
factory or assembly line of Russian Su-39 and buying over 100 modern Western
multipurpose planes like F/A-18 Hornet, F-16 Falcon, Mirage 2000 or JAS-39 Grippen.
The Czech Republic has decided to produce its own light combat aircraft L-159 (in
cooperation with Boeing) to replace old Russian Mig-21 and Mig-23s (temporarily) and
to buy from the same range of Western aircraft like Poland later. Hungary has considered
buying 30 or so new Western aircraft to modernise its air defence in the much the same
way as the Czechs and the Poles. It would be in the best interest of all three countries to
buy the aircraft together from the same source in order to minimise the costs and then
make maintenance and operation cheaper. For some reasons, though, perhaps because
of different national interests, it seems common procurement is not going to take place.
The options have gradually narrowed down. For technical (high maintenance costs, high
level of fuel consumption) and political reason (the uncertainties of the market), as well
as for the non-compatibility of Russian equipment, it is highly unlikely that any of the
new member-states would buy Russian made planes. France, too, did not offer its most
modern aircraft for sale to the new members: for this, the French aircraft may also be
out of the race. The JAS-39 seems to be an attractive option, particularly if one takes
into account the flexible financial arrangement offered, but it has not been exported
widely; plus the United States, whenever the procurement becomes topical, in all likelihood
will use its persuasiveness to convince the new members to “buy American”12.
All the three new member states understand the importance of intellectual
interoperability with NATO. This includes not only the way of thinking but also
language training and the implementation of operational command procedures as the
basis of cooperation between armed forces. It looks now that the most difficult part of
intellectual interoperability will not be the command of the English language. There
is in each country a number of officers whose knowledge is reasonably good, which
may be not worse than some other member State’s. Rather the most demanding element
seems the application of standing operating procedures (SOPs). Already there is a
number of officers who work at different NATO headquarters and the preparation of
others is a priority of each MOD13, but it is an open question how their knowledge
will be used after their return from the respective NATO commands. The problem of
preparing NCO personnel for positions may be more severe.
Though the three countries have certainly set out to reach compatibility with NATO
standards, their advance has been hesitant and uneven in certain critical areas. As one
might expect Poland has taken the lead in its efforts based on its security concerns, its
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high GDP growth rate and broader social support for defence. The Czech Republic,
particularly by a major sudden increase of its defence budget, has made efforts to upgrade
its defence. This has been crippled, however, by slow economic growth since 1997 and
the conveniently threat-free atmosphere that does not provide for extensive support of
defence efforts in the society. Hungary represents a very interesting case. In spite of its
geo-strategic location, which places it adjacent to any conflict in the post-Yugoslav space,
it has been lagging behind in meeting each target goal. The defence budget has started
to increase but due to the insufficient accomplishments of military reform it has not
contributed to the fulfilment of force goals. This insufficiency is due to a number of
factors ranging from the policy of the government and the incompetence of the leadership
of the Ministry of Defence to the personal conflicts diverting valuable time and energy
away from military reform. The current government upon its inception of power in the
summer of 1998 declared NATO accession a “done deal”. It did not realise that though
accession had been completed as a diplomatic task, the military implementation was just
about to begin and would require the concentration of resources, human and material
alike. As part of a political deal, the two top level jobs in the Defence Ministry were filled
by people who have so far demonstrated utter incompetence. Furthermore, instead of
focusing on the strategic review, the energies of some competent leaders of the ministry
have been sapped by personal rivalries and the regulation of such marginal issues as the
place of the chief of staff in the (re)integrated defence ministry’s hierarchy. One hopes
that sooner or later Hungary will live up to its responsibility and be a far more performing
member of the Alliance than it is nowadays.
If one assumes that the contribution of the three new members to the performance
of the Alliance as far as their military competence, human compatibility and armaments
are concerned has been marginal at best the question emerges: Is there any contribution
that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland can make? The answer is conditionally in
the affirmative. The three countries have been contributing both before and after accession
to different peace operations including Desert Storm, IFOR/SFOR, the Kosovo operation
and KFOR. While the military significance of the contributions may be belittled, it is
important to state that the success of such operations is often dependent on the involvement
of several countries, large and small. It is also important to note that all the three countries
“inherited large training facilities from the Cold War period, which have already won
great favour with NATO troops. This is an important asset, given the tighter political
and environmental constraints some Allies are facing in using their domestic facilities.14”
Last but not least, Hungary has also contributed to the success of peace settlements in the
post-Yugoslav area, offering its airspace for monitoring by AWACS planes and, later,
hosting IFOR and SFOR troops prior to their deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
One can conclude that, even though the contribution of the three is primarily of political
and logistical nature at present, their contributions to non-Article 5 operations and the
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readiness to offer their sovereign territory for such missions demonstrated high levels of
commitment even before accession. Whether the adaptation process of the three countries
beyond minimum compatibility will be sufficiently successful remains to be seen. This
process is underway, though the result remains inconclusive for the time being.
LESSONS FROM AN OPERATION
On 12 March 1999 three countries joined NATO. Less than two weeks later the
Alliance was at war. The three countries had to share the responsibility with the other
members without having the multiyear experience in the Alliance. I do not intend to
deal with the general conclusions one can draw from the Kosovo operation for the
functioning of the current international system or for the evolution of international
law. I confine myself to what one can learn concerning the contribution of the three
new members. The conclusions may be divided into two parts: General ones applicable
to all three new member States and ones that are specific to one country or the other,
among which are the conclusions relevant to Hungary. Hungary had a unique role
during the conflict as member of the Alliance. It has a long land border with Serbia
where a more than 300,000 ethnic Hungarian minority lives. Both features are unique
and of utmost relevance in the Alliance.
The following general conclusions can be drawn. The Alliance with 19 members
functioned just as smoothly as it would have with 16 or less countries15. The three new
members understood their role in the operation and were ready to play a policy taker
role. They were playing along with other members of the Alliance in spite of the severe
conceptual shortcomings of the operation16. With one exception the three did not take
the diplomatic initiative and let other players (the U.S., the EU and Russia) make attempts
to solve the conflict. All three kept low profiles and it was apparent they were going
through a NATO “crash course” in practice. They demonstrated resolve to live up to
the responsibility expected from members of the Alliance without challenging consensus.
In light of Hungary’s special interests the issue of the Kosovo air campaign appeared
on different levels of the country’s agenda. When making an attempt to contemplate the
country’s role it is impossible to draw any conclusion without paying attention to three
levels simultaneously. Though it would be tempting to analyse the position of the government
exclusively, this would not indicate the complexity of the Kosovo operation for Hungary.
It is therefore also necessary to follow Hungary’s attitude as a new member of the Alliance
that gained membership after several years of determined effort to join NATO. One must
not ignore the domestic political aspects as a third level of analysis either17.
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On the government level Hungary proved to be a loyal and trustworthy NATO
ally. From the very beginning it did not hesitate to take decisions necessary to support
the operation to the maximum extent. The very day the operation started the Hungarian
Parliament passed a resolution that permitted NATO aircraft not only to use the airspace
of the country but to use the airfields and their service facilities by NATO reconnaissance,
fighter and transport planes as well as helicopters18, permission which was taken advantage
of quite extensively by the Alliance. Several times it was emphasised that NATO did
not expect Hungary’s direct involvement in the operation19. There was, of course, huge
interest whether the operation would continue with the use of ground forces. The
Prime Minister denied that such an option was ever considered, whereas the minister
of defence was of the view that consideration was indeed given to launching the offensive
from Macedonia (and thus not from Hungary)20. The geographical question was
particularly sensitive for a number of reasons; primarily, as the terrain in the north of
Serbia (from the direction of Hungary) would have been more conducive for the
launching of a land offensive than from any other conceivable direction.
Hungary was interested in preventing installations in Vojvodina, which is more
than 15 per cent inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, from being targeted. The Alliance
also took into consideration the specific character of some parts of Yugoslavia, practising
self-constraint in Montenegro as it had a pro-Western government and a constitutional
status that distinguished it from Serbia. Even though the Alliance noticed the Hungarian
concern related to Vojvodina, it was not in the position to exclude the region from
the target list. As was mentioned by NATO sources: One of the objectives of the
NATO operation is “to prevent Belgrade’s military machine to feel safe anywhere in
its territory”21.
Hungary’s resolve as a new ally was tested on a number of occasions. When Russia
and Belarus sent humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia in April the trucks were stopped on
the Ukrainian-Hungarian border. The Hungarian authorities concluded that there
were several items in the trucks whose supply would be in violation of the UN embargo22.
In the end, the embargoed products were returned to Ukraine (and further to Russia).
The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the commitment to provide Russia
with a list outlining transit requirements to Yugoslavia. The reference to the UN
embargo, and not to the ongoing NATO operation, proved particularly useful as it
provided solid legal ground23.
In sum, a realist analysis of the Hungarian attitude during the Kosovo operation
could conclude that the Hungarian government cooperated at a high level with its new
allies and was ready to make sacrifices in spite of its difficult situation and somewhat
controversial interests in the conflict. The positive assessment during the Kosovo
operation does not, however, extend to the post-conflict phase. Already during the war
the Hungarian conservative government was not strong enough to take a tough stance
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against those extremist forces that thought it was time to consider some vaguely
formulated territorial revision. It took Prime Minister Orbán two months to disassociate
himself from those extremist circles in an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung24. In July 1999 the Hungarian Prime Minister found the opportunity to raise
the issue of autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina in spite of the repeated
requests of his negotiating partner not to do so, the context being that, in light of the
sacrifices the Hungarian community had to make during the air campaign against
Yugoslavia, the community “deserves” autonomy. Informally, this request was declared
a “disproportionate demand”. Six weeks later in a radio interview the Prime Minister
said it was useless “for the government to sharply dissociate itself from the HJLP’s25
efforts for border revision”, adding that the government should be tackling more
important questions. Border revisions and other HJLP issues do not belong to these
questions, he said26. It remains to be seen whether this relatively weak stance on a major
foreign affairs issue is based on a temporary misperception or is it a long term deviation
from a reasonable foreign policy based on consensus.
CONCLUSION
The three new members of the Atlantic Alliance, while not being adequately
prepared militarily upon accession, have demonstrated high levels of loyalty ever since,
being ready to make certain sacrifices in the service of common goals both before and
after accession. This was demonstrated particularly clearly during several peace support
operations before accession and during the Kosovo campaign afterwards.
NATO should use the experience from the first wave of eastern enlargement
when preparing for the integration of other States from the same region. This is
particularly important when fiscal priorities are turned into force goals. In light of
the long military procurement life-cycle it is premature to tell whether the three
countries are on the right track as far as technical and human compatibility. No doubt,
there are both encouraging and discouraging signs. Bearing in mind the complex
system of priorities in front of each government of East Central Europe some pressure
may be necessary in order to show the direction each should take. In this respect the
helpful orientation should come from those NATO member countries that have
accumulated the necessary experience and the sufficient empathy to understand the
problems of the countries in transition.
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